海馬斯朝中國大陸的方向開火，究竟只是演習，還是戰略訊號？
2027到底是開戰倒數，還是中共能力驗收？
當台海危機逐漸逼近，我們必須看清楚真正的答案。我們邀請到「國防安全研究院委任副研究員 揭仲博士」帶大家深入解析！(圖片擷取自SMARTnews Youtube )
目錄
中共首度宣稱與那國島周邊為管轄範圍
北京為何挑與那國島施壓
共軍對日本連續發動三波施壓行動
中共又開始擔憂台灣可能調整南海主權主張
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中共施壓的工具，除原本的海警與海巡等公務船，共軍機艦自6月6日起也開始加入對日本施壓；施壓的區域也從台灣東部EEZ海域與釣魚台周邊，擴大到與那國島及沖繩島周遭海域，更在6月11日上午，派出二艘隸屬三沙綜合執法支隊的大型公務船，侵入南沙太平島禁止水域，最近時距太平島僅2.1浬，創下中共公務船刻意侵入太平島周邊禁限水域的首例。
中共將施壓範圍擴大到與那國島和太平島，似乎顯示北京開始擔心台灣為了「倚外謀獨」，在台灣東部、甚至南海主權主張上做出讓步。
至於中共為何要推翻行之有年的默契，派大型公務船侵入太平島禁止水域，不排除是台灣外交部在日菲宣布啟動劃界談判後，第一時間表示「肯定」的作法，被中共認定為台灣不惜在相關海域的爭議問題上讓步，以換取日菲協助台灣「倚外謀獨」；在海峽兩岸官方嚴重缺乏互信的情況下，遂使北京開始擔心日後台灣政府對南海，會不會也和台灣東部的EEZ一樣，願意調整主權主張，來換取美國、日本和菲律賓的支持，以推動北京眼中的「倚外謀獨」。
一旦中共常態化派公務船進入太平島禁限制水域巡弋，恐怕會引發連鎖效應，連帶導致越南與菲律賓等國，也大舉增加派公務船前往同一海域的頻率，使太平島周遭海域的情勢出現重大變化。國安單位應未雨綢繆，針對可能發生的狀況預做準備。
The article I published on June 5 in Storm Media now has an English version, with the title adjusted to “Beijing’s Maritime Legal War Reaches Taiwan’s Eastern Waters." Please refer to it for further details.
北京川習會落幕後，根據美國川普總統的發言，將高達140億美元的對台軍售案視為談判籌碼，並表示暫緩決定。此話一出，隨即引發台海高度焦慮。
雖然美國國會與國務卿盧比歐隨後滅火，強調對台政策未變，但這筆包含增程型愛國者三型飛彈、國家先進地對空防空飛彈系統等關鍵裝備的延宕，究竟會對國軍防禦帶來哪些實質衝擊？面對中共軍機、軍艦的演習與威脅，我們又該如何因應？
本集特別邀請到淡江大學整合戰略與科技研究中心研究員揭仲，他曾擔任國會辦公室主任長達17年，其中15年在國防委員會與外交國防委員會，也是國防部「114年四年期國防總檢討」諮詢委員，將分析川普總統為何公開表示對台軍售，可能作為美國與中國的談判條件，以及這筆140億美元的軍售案的內容，及對台灣防禦的關鍵影響。
此外，更從軍售延遲之際，台灣本身可以採取的因應作為，包括軍售之外爭取商售的可能性，以及無人機防禦的自主研發和部署等，提出見解。並深入剖析華府當前對台海軍事衝突風險的態度，建言台灣可以扮演的角色。歡迎收聽！
中共外交部發言人毛寧6月2日的談話，極可能意味著中共不排除利用這個事件，持續對日菲二國施壓，希望能迫使日菲二國就劃界所衍生的相關事宜，與中共、而非我方談判，建立其管轄權及於臺灣東部海域的新事證；並進一步藉區域各國是與北京談判的事實，將原本僅針對臺灣的矮化性法律戰，轉變為針對中華民國國際人格的國際性法律戰。
中共也很可能想藉機以抗議、反制日菲片面談判劃界為由，開始派海警船編隊，以每個月至少幾次、每次至少持續一定時間的模式，常態化進入台灣東面、我方專屬經濟海域卻遭日菲納入談判範圍的海域巡弋。換言之，中共想利用此一情形，伺機建立在臺灣東部、我方依《國際海洋法公約》主張的專屬經濟海域範圍，常態化巡弋甚至執法等「管轄」的事實，將侵蝕我方管轄權的法律戰行動範圍，擴張到臺灣東部我方的專屬經濟區海域。(圖片擷取自風傳媒網頁)
The remarks made by Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Mao Ning(毛寧) on June 2 likely indicate that the China does not exclude the possibility of using this event to continue applying pressure on Japan and the Philippines. The aim is to compel these two countries to negotiate related matters arising from the delimitation with the China, rather than with Taiwan, thereby establishing new evidence of its jurisdiction in the eastern waters of Taiwan. Furthermore, by leveraging the fact that regional countries are negotiating with Beijing, this could transform the originally Taiwan-targeted degrading legal warfare into an international legal warfare aimed at undermining the international persona of the Republic of China.
The China may also seek to use this opportunity to protest against and counter the unilateral delimitation negotiations by Japan and the Philippines by beginning to deploy Coast Guard vessels in a manner that normalizes their patrols in the waters off Taiwan’s eastern coast—areas that Taiwan claims as its EEZ but which have been included in the negotiation scope by Japan and the Philippines. In other words, the China aims to exploit this situation to establish a routine presence of patrols and even law enforcement within the scope of Taiwan’s EEZ in the eastern waters, thereby expanding the legal warfare actions that erode Taiwan’s jurisdiction into these areas.
Chung Chieh(揭仲) provided an example, stating that the P&A data is equivalent to a quotation submitted by potential vendors, while the LOA draft is the contract draft during formal negotiations between the two parties. Both sides can negotiate the items, amounts, and payment milestones in the LOA draft before finalizing and signing it. Once the LOA is signed, the U.S. government will represent the purchasing country in subsequent processes such as vendor selection, negotiation, production, and delivery.
The advantage of this system is that the U.S. government will execute project management for the purchasing country; however, the downside is that it excludes certain clauses found in general commercial contracts, such as dispute resolution and arbitration mechanisms, primarily to facilitate the operations of U.S. administrative departments.
He noted that prior to Tsai Ing-wen’s administration, the U.S. insisted that Taiwan’s military procurement procedures must begin with a request for P&A. If the U.S. agreed to provide P&A, it would signify interdepartmental review and consent to sell. Taiwan would then plan its budget and apply for the LOR for LOA based on the P&A. However, since 2016, the U.S. has allowed Taiwan to skip the P&A stage and directly apply for the LOA draft when necessary.
He interpreted that the M1A2T budget exceeding nearly 5 billion NTD is due to the Army’s procurement process for the M1A2T, which aimed to expedite the project by skipping the LOR for P&A stage and relying on price data previously presented in a military exchange meeting. This approach overlooked significant price fluctuations over the years without obtaining a formal quotation, resulting in an underestimated budget. (圖片擷取自聯合報數位版)
/https://vip.udn.com/vip/story/121160/9544803?from=vipudn_maincate_main2
Chung Chieh (揭仲) indicated that further actions should not be ruled out, including more frequent incursions by Chinese Coast Guard vessels into Taiwan’s eastern waters. The heightened activity aims to create opportunities for negotiations with Japan and the Philippines. Taiwan also has the right to assert its claims over its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and should negotiate with Japan and the Philippines, emphasizing the necessity of defending its interests.
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On June 2, Chung Chieh (揭仲), an adjunct assistant professor at Tamkang University’s Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies, analyzed for the Central News Agency that Chinese Coast Guard vessels have previously operated in Taiwan’s eastern waters. Beijing is using this incident to strengthen its patrol intensity, aiming to engage in a legal battle against Taiwan by asserting “One China” across the Taiwan Strait and claiming sovereignty and jurisdiction over Taiwan.
He noted that Beijing has been working to eliminate jurisdictional gaps in its claims, such as areas east of the median line in the Taiwan Strait and restricted waters around Taiwan’s offshore islands. Through this incident, Beijing aims to establish precedents for exercising jurisdiction in the relevant maritime areas via actual actions such as patrols; the emphasis on “first independent actions” serves more of a propaganda purpose.
至於川普為何游移不定，除對等關稅失效與美伊戰爭懸而未決，使華府談判地位受挫；更重要的是中共看準川普因美伊戰爭導致國內支持率下挫、連共和黨的基本盤都受衝擊的情況下，使川普能否從北京帶回大單，對提振共和黨期中選舉選情的重要性上升；加上到今年底前，包括9月24日習近平回訪華府，川普和習近平預計將再碰面三次，使中共可藉由將大筆採購清單分階段承諾、分階段兌現的方式，對今年底前的美台政治與軍事交流，包括軍售，獲致令白宮難以忽視的影響力。
除200架波音客機與重新開放美國牛肉比較明確，其餘僅是意願表達，後續還需經過一系列的磋商，逐步將農產品、石油、液化天然氣和能源的採購明細與數量明確化，才能對共和黨期中選舉的選情產生助益；川普之所以建議習近平9月24日造訪華府，也是考量習若同意，在出發前有可能讓前述採購清單明確化，當作給川普的伴手禮；將時間訂在9月中下旬，是為了有足夠的時間，將這些大單的效應轉化為選票。
值得注意的是，客機、發動機、農產品與能源採購所影響的區域，多數是川普及共和黨的基本盤；且共和黨目前在總數435席的聯邦眾議院佔有220席，只比民主黨的215席多出5席，比過半數所需的218席更僅多出2席。倘若共和黨於11月3日聯邦眾議員全數改選時，在基本盤與原本具優勢的選區意外輸掉3席，就將失去對眾議院的控制。使中共的大單效應可否在9月底前開始發酵，就可能對共和黨能否繼續掌控參眾兩院、即川普能否繼續「完全執政」，造成直接的影響。(圖片擷取自風傳媒網頁)
《當和平被摧毀：台海防衛戰略》，以4種中國侵台情境為想定主軸，延伸超過10個關鍵議題，深入探討兩岸一旦發生戰事，台灣將如何因應與自處。
第一集〈東風飛彈來襲〉聚焦共軍首波飛彈飽和攻擊，推演台灣哪些關鍵設施，可能成為首要攻擊目標。面對威脅，國軍該如何因應？「台灣之盾」又將如何發揮關鍵作用？必要時，台灣是否能夠進行源頭打擊，藉此削弱敵方後續攻勢？
節目將透過兵棋推演，邀集軍事專家，一同推敲共軍侵台樣態；同時，結合各領域專家學者訪問，與主持人外景口述，模擬戰爭逼近時的關鍵抉擇。 (文字說明與圖片擷取自 華視新聞 我想問的是….. Youtube 頻道 )
揭仲指出，美國行政部門今年一月就向美國國會領袖非正式簡報，若川普貿然取消全案，勢必面臨國會非常大的反彈。然而，川習會剛落幕，雙方才剛鉅細靡遺討論過台灣議題，習近平九月還要訪問華府，美中在這段期間可能還會再有新一波貿易採購。因此，就算川普政府沒取消軍售案，推遲可能性也不低，或者切割案項，先通過一部分，其餘的等到美國期中選舉後再宣布。
第二波軍購案可能延遲半年。揭仲分析，第二波軍售清單可能包括整合式反無人機系統、愛國者三型防空飛彈、NASAMS中低空防空飛彈及增補反戰車飛彈庫存等項目，假如公布期程延後，自然影響軍購案的正式啟動時間和排隊順序，尤其若無法及時搭上某些生產批次，就可能造成交貨時間比原本預期更晚。
他指出，尤其對「台灣之盾」的建構步驟之一，就是搭配第二批軍購的「增程型愛國者三型飛彈」同步引進IBCS整合防空作戰指揮系統，並以IBCS為核心，嫁接整合國內現有的美製防空感測系統。若延後到位，代表我方開始整合美製防空系統的時程將會延後。尤其在波灣戰事爆發之後，美軍、中東各國以及歐洲國家對於愛國者、NASAMS等武器系統的需求大增，若錯過這班車，不但可能大幅延後，成本也可能大增。(圖片擷取自聯合新聞網網頁)
揭仲說，中方很清楚地想在此次川習會上談台獨及軍售議題，也當然希望有個結果，就看美國是否接受；但值得擔心的是，美方可以在沒有聯合聲明的狀況下，憑著默契行事。例如第二波的140億美元軍售，一直不宣布。
揭仲分析，川普顯然是希望從北京帶回大的交易，而如果川習會一結束，美方馬上宣布140億美元、幾乎是有史以來最大的軍售案，北京難以下台階，可能就會推遲對美採購案，甚至直接取消承諾，因此川普不排除會再拖一陣子。雖然不至於完全取消第二波軍售，因為美國政府今年年初應該就已經非正式地通知國會領袖，此時若要取消會引起國會很多意見；但其實有擱置的空間，拖到期中選舉結束之後，國會應該也能夠承受，畢竟這直接牽涉到很多議員的選情。
揭仲強調，這個手法可能透過默契安排，不必寫在聯合聲明上，而是可以靠行政部門的作為來達成；如今川普將和習近平談對台軍售，朝這方向走的機率不排除更大。
/https://www.mirrordaily.news/story/60513?utm_source=feed_related&utm_medium=mirrormedia
台灣多數橋樑無法通行M1A2T戰車，影響沒有想像中嚴重!只要戰車部隊各級指揮官，甚至各車的車長與駕駛，在承平時期做好戰場經營，切實掌握防區內橋樑與道路的狀況，規劃數條從營區開往戰力保存區，及從戰力保存區進入戰術位置時的機動路線，就可迎刃而解。就算前往戰術位置的機動路線上，真的無合適橋樑可用，或既有橋樑遭破壞，只要事先做好準備，還是能藉良好的計畫作為，運用工程手段或工兵裝備來克服。
在國軍從事的是國土防衛作戰，部隊早就「先處戰地」的情況下，單憑橋樑承重、地形破碎、高耗油甚至不適合城鎮地型等理由，就認定M1A2T戰車無用武之地，確實有「以偏概全」的情形；因為這些顧慮，都可透過平日的戰場經營來化解，絕非「不可承受之重」!
國人也該認清，在現代的戰場條件下，主力戰車雖已不再具備「陸戰霸王」的主宰地位，但因為主力戰車能兼顧火力、機動力與防護力，使其在現代的兵種聯合作戰中，仍將扮演重要的腳色。試問，若僅因為無人機對戰甲車所造成的威脅日益升高，就將戰甲車棄之不用；屆時步兵就必須自己扛著裝備與物資，靠雙腿機動，然後在敵軍的旺盛火力下，僅憑血肉之軀，對敵軍的設防陣地與障礙物發起攻擊，這顯然不切實際。(圖片擷取自風傳媒網頁)
目錄
美國尋求歐洲造船廠合作的原因
在特別預算送出前 美國尋找歐洲合作的努力即已碰壁
特別預算送出後 美國尋求歐洲合作的努力仍未成功
預算審查延宕固然使華府不悅，卻不是讓華府態度轉變的原因。真正導致破局的關鍵，是美國從2002年初到2007年底，始終無法找到願意與美國合作的歐洲國家，包括原本寄予厚望的德國和西班牙。
Abstract:
In writings on logistics mobilization, mainland Chinese academics use the term “large-scale joint operations” to refer to possible use of force against Taiwan. To cope with the resulting challenges for materiel supply support, medical service support, and transportation and delivery support, communist China lists the Eastern Theater Command of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as a “basic mobilization area,” which will launch full mobilization in all areas and spheres. Provinces and cities near the Eastern TC are “auxiliary mobilization areas,” which mobilize personnel and resources to compensate for the basic mobilization area’s resource deficiencies. In addition, “specific mobilization” covering businesses such as information, transportation, materials supply, medical service, construction, and energy will be launched across mainland China. Other theaters where “chain reaction warfare” is possible are categorized as “stand-by areas for mobilization,” with target-specific mobilization in limited areas, such as homeland air defense, border defense, maintenance of social order, production of military items, and evacuation of people. The aim is to ensure that armed conflicts and disruptive activities incited by domestic and hostile elements overseas will be effectively neutralized.
Judging from publicly available research and observation of the PLA’s joint logistics support and mobilization systems performance in the fight against the new coronavirus pandemic, we believe that the PLA’s logistics support capabilities for “large-scale joint operations,” whether in materiel supply support, medical service support, or transportation and delivery support, are currently insufficient to reach the goal of “fighting a quick battle for a quick result.” The PLA has taken extensive measures to enhance its logistics mobilization capacity to meet the requirements of “fighting a quick battle for a quick result” in “large-scale joint operations” against Taiwan. These include 12 categories: building theater joint operations logistics support network, completing the construction of a support base system, strengthening the mobile support force, boosting military logistics capacity build-up, establishing informatized joint logistics support capability, upgrading the capability to rescue and evacuate the wounded, improving trans-regional transportation and delivery capability, bringing to perfection the examination of national defense potential, establishing a “pre-positioning mobilization” mechanism, expanding new types of militia and the scale of mobilization of businesses, building an advanced national defense mobilization command information system, and consolidating civil-military integration.
Keywords: large-scale joint operations, PLA reform, provincial military district, joint logistics support force, mobilization, invasion
Chung Chieh(揭仲) stated that the backbone of the Taiwanese military’s artillery in the future will consist of 111 M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), 60 M109A7 self-propelled howitzers, and several International Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems (IFATDS). If the Ministry of National Defense confirms this year to send a combined arms battalion and regional command to form a brigade command group to participate in the annual “Western Strike” field artillery and high-intensity combat exercises in the U.S., the intention should be to enable Taiwanese field troops and command personnel to gain an in-depth understanding of modern ground combat dynamics and processes.
Chung Chieh(揭仲) believes that sending field troops and command officers to the U.S. for the “Western Strike” exercises before acquiring the M109A7 self-propelled howitzers and IFATDS will not only shorten the time required for these units to become combat-ready once the equipment arrives but will also allow the Taiwanese ground forces and field commanders to practically understand how the kill chain in modern ground combat operates and the extent of current deficiencies within the Taiwanese military. This experience will enable these personnel to return home as advocates for innovation, accelerating the reform and modernization of the army.
Furthermore, Chung Chieh(揭仲) recommended that, given the severe inadequacy of artillery firing ranges on the main island of Taiwan, and considering the significantly increased range of the M142 HIMARS and M109A7 self-propelled howitzers, it is difficult to conduct live-fire training under tactical scenarios on Taiwanese land. Therefore, the Ministry of National Defense should negotiate with the U.S. to adopt a model similar to that of the Air Force’s Luke Air Force Base, retaining some M142 HIMARS and M109A7 self-propelled howitzers in the U.S. Each year, personnel could be sent to the U.S. to utilize these retained assets for advanced tactical training and testing. This approach would not only enhance training effectiveness and assimilate new knowledge but also deepen bilateral exchanges between ground forces. (Image sourced from the digital edition of the United Daily News.)
揭仲的國防與中共軍事專題研究 
近期迴響